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The historical trajectory of the Iraqi nation-state has been profoundly marked by its role 
as a political-institutional laboratory of grand imperial projects. Its first master, United 
Kingdom, first forged Iraq from the three former Mesopotamian provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire (1918) and then experimented different forms of governance, from 
direct rule (1918-1920 and 1941-1945) to indirect rule as a Mandate power alongside 
of the Hashemite monarchy (1921-1932) to informal influence on an independent 
state (1932-1941 and 1945-1958). Its second master, the United States, treaded 
down the same path from direct rule through the CPA of Paul Bremer (2003-2004) to 
indirect rule alongside democratically elected governments (2004-2010) to Obama’s 
envisioned informal rule after the alleged departure of all combat troops (from 2010). 
The commonality between the two cases cannot be limited to the attempt to exert a 
political/economic control over the Iraqi territory; in both cases the foreign powers 
endeavoured to create a self-sustainable nation-state which could serve as a model to 
all other countries in the region and in the global South: autonomous, yet pro-Western 
and liberal-democratic. 
The book of Dawisha is a masterly study of the political development of Iraq which 
aims at accounting for the feasibility and problems of this perspective. A supporter 
of regime change and of many tenets of the neo-conservative project, after 2004 
Dawisha tried “to make sense of the quagmire into which Iraq seemed to be sinking”. 
What went wrong after the US invasion? Was the neo-conservative dream doomed 
from the start, did some major mistake jeopardise it, or was there still hope of a viable, 
pacified and friendly Iraq? With this idea in mind he thus turned to a detailed analysis 
of Iraqi history and, specifically, to the three fields of state-building, nation-building 
and democracy-building.
This approach explains some unexpected features of the narrative, such as the 
marginalisation of the theme of socio-economic modernisation, the disproportioned 
attention to the monarchical era (1921-1958: 7 chapters and 162 pages) versus the 
republican era (1958-2003: 2 chapters and 70 pages) and the overall benign attitude 
vis-a-vis the imperial power of the day. Within these limits, however, Dawisha provides 
a clear, accurate and comprehensive historical narrative of the highest standard. The 
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extensive use of Arabic-language primary and secondary sources lends to the description 
of political processes an accuracy never reached by other historical accounts, usually 
dominated by English-language sources. Particularly interesting and innovative is his 
treatment of the status of liberal-democratic freedoms in the different periods. Finally, 
although the political leanings of the author are transparent from his discussion of 
events and personalities, he never hides historical facts which could contradict his 
theses and thus provides an honest basis for further discussion and analysis. 
Ultimately, the UK attempt to forge a pro-British and liberal Iraq to serve as model for 
the decolonising Middle Eastern states was derailed by the surge of the nationalist 
agitation of the middle and popular classes, temporarily in 1941 and definitively in 
1958. The outcome of the US attempt to mould a pro-American and democratic Iraq to 
serve as a model for a “new Middle East” has led to an impoverished and disintegrated 
polity and seems equally bound to fail. Why?
Dawisha enumerates some specific realities and policy blunders which brought to 
the present quagmire: the failure to defeat the insurgency (partially overcome after 
Petraeus’s “surge” of 2007), the weakening of the state through Bremer’s decision 
to disband the army and ban the Baathists from civil service and, above all, the 
decision initiated by Bremer and exacerbated after the transfer of sovereignty in 2004 
to entrench the ethnosectarian divide within the Iraqi political system. Disillusioned 
by the post-2003 developments, Dawisha nevertheless concludes by partially 
justifying this outcome with reference to the “[structural] fragility of the social order”, 
“ethnosectarian entrenchments” which pre-existed the intervention and made “the 
probability of communal conflict [...] pretty high”, and the absence of a socio-economic 
condition conducive to democratisation. This sudden lapse into historical fatalism is 
symptomatic of the key flaw of the author’s argument: his inability to understand that 
throughout Iraqi history the project of building a viable and cohesive nation-state 
was inevitably and unavoidably bound to clash with its dependency on an imperial 
centre. 
The creation of an overarching sense of national belonging among the members of 
the different (religious, ethnical, linguistic, ecological, tribal, local, socio-professional) 
groups which were catapulted within the Iraqi state in 1918 required two very concrete 
preconditions: the expansion of the role of the state in the provision of security, 
education, jobs, social services and economic development to its citizens, and the 
equitable distribution of the benefits among the different sections of society. 
On the first account, the state needed the financial and technical means to carry 
out these tasks. In the post-1918 period, the British presence directly or indirectly 
prevented the exploitation of the few resources available: the oil revenue, the 
agricultural revenue and the revenue from prospective industrialisation. In the post-
2003 situation national socio-economic development, already in tatters after 23 years 
of wars and international sanctions, was similarly blocked by the sell-out of the only 
significant resource left to the country, the oil industry, to international corporations. 
On the second account, an inclusive Iraqi nationalism had to prevail over other 
particularistic ideologies (e.g. Sunni-dominated pan-Arabism, Kurdish nationalism, 
Bo
ok
 Re
vie
w
99
Journal of  Global 
Analysis 
Shi’ite dominance). Both imperial powers, faced with the choice between preserving 
their influence and allowing an anti-Western national development, chose instead to 
practice the classic policy of “divide and rule”. While in the British case they ultimately 
failed, provoking the formation and victory of a broad “Iraq first” alliance of the 
middle-class and working-class sections of all major communities, albeit unstable 
and deformed by the central role of the military, in the American case they have 
temporarily succeeded, turning a broad but disparate armed resistance against the 
occupation into a civil war between spatially segregated and intolerant ethnosectarian 
communities. 
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